




Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6

Top Secret




# National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday*  
*18 April 1979*

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret




25X1


Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6



## Contents



25X1


### Special Analysis

Turkey: *The Kurdish Problem* . . . . . 14

Overnight Reports . . . . . 19

The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6


25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6

Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6

## Kurdish-Inhabited Areas in Turkey











25X1

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

TURKEY: The Kurdish Problem




*The resurgence of Kurdish separatist sentiment in Iran and continued Kurdish unrest in Iraq have evoked fears among Turkey's leaders that Turkish Kurds may become unruly.*



25X1

## Kurdish-Inhabited Area



624958 4 79

25X1

Profile of a People: Resistance and Reaction

Some 10 million to 15 million Kurds inhabit the rugged highlands cutting across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Soviet Armenia; the largest segment--roughly 5 million--resides in Turkey. The Kurds' distinct language and culture, seminomadic life, and tribal loyalties have endowed them with a sense of separate national identity. Their allegiance to the host states is often tenuous, and they have frequently rebelled. [REDACTED]

25X1

Turkey's Kurds, driven not just by a general desire for self-rule but also by unhappiness over the modernizing and centralizing reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s and 1930s, staged large-scale uprisings on several occasions earlier in this century. Turkish authorities ruthlessly suppressed these revolts and subsequently sought to eliminate all manifestations of Kurdish nationalism and limit expressions of Kurdish culture. Kurdish publications were officially proscribed, and Kurds thereafter were characterized officially as "eastern Turks." These measures did not eradicate the Kurds' sense of separate identity, but a combination of force and a network of political accommodations between Kurdish notables and local politicians kept the area fairly quiet. [REDACTED]

25X1

Since the advent of Turkish democracy in the late 1940s, government policy has favored cooptation over suppression. Significant numbers of Kurds have been recruited into the ruling elite--albeit probably not at a rate commensurate with their percentage of the population; Kurds are particularly underrepresented in the military.

25X1

--continued

25X1






25X1

Persistence of Kurdish Nationalism

Neither the twin forces of government suppression and cooptation nor the conservative influence of local Kurdish chieftains has been able to quash the drive by many Kurds for autonomy or independence. The Kurdish language flourishes, and few Kurds are fluent in Turkish.




25X1

25X1

Foreign Connections

The Turkish imagination has always been stirred by the thought that Turkish Kurds may be manipulated by some


--continued



25X1




25X1


external force. Iranian and Iraqi Kurds have in fact co-operated with foreign powers in the past, usually to their own disadvantage. 

25X1

25X1




25X1


Even so, the potential impact on Turkish Kurds of an autonomous or independent Kordestan in Iran and the clear indications noted by Ankara of at least some cross-border activity involving Turkish Kurds have been enough to make the government and the military nervous. 

#### Outlook


25X1

Despite Ankara's fears, the chances are slim, barring a major breakdown in the authority of the central government, that there will be another mass rebellion of Turkish Kurds similar to the outbreaks in the 1920s and 1930s. 

25X1



25X1



25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6



25X1

#### OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

#### Afghanistan


The US Embassy in Kabul reported this morning that [redacted] convinced that antigovernment violence of some sort will break out in Kabul today. The Embassy has no firm evidence that violence will occur today or in the near future and doubts that antigovernment forces can mount a serious threat in the capital. It points out, however, that sporadic violence by small groups aimed at individual government leaders, ministries, or the Soviet Embassy is always possible. [redacted]

#### Lebanon


According to the US Consulate in Jerusalem, four of the five Lebanese Army platoons scheduled to assume positions in southern Lebanon completed their deployment today. The Lebanese, however, have still not established their headquarters in the area and continue to insist on the location proposed by the Lebanese Government in the original deployment plan. Major Haddad, the renegade leader of the Christian-controlled southern enclaves, has hampered transportation by blocking coastal highways in the area, but his forces have ceased their earlier shelling of the UN peacekeeping force positions. [redacted]

COMMENT: Major Haddad is convinced that the Lebanese troops will be used to crack down on his forces, which, with Israeli support, have operated independently of the Lebanese Government for over a year. The situation is further complicated because the Lebanese Army commander is a Muslim Haddad briefly detained in 1977 and because the Army unit is over 70 percent Muslim. [redacted]

--continued





25X1




25X1

Liberia

The US Embassy in Monrovia, in a preliminary assessment of the Liberian economic situation, details the severe and longlasting economic impact of the weekend rioting. Estimates of damage to the local economy run as high as \$200 million. These losses will seriously dampen investment activity; large sums of money have reportedly already left the country. The Embassy comments that the Liberian Government, demoralized by the political situation, will now be sorely tested by this economic crisis.



25X1




25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6



**Top Secret**

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300150002-6